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Abstract 
On what basis do we learn to make effective decisions when faced with inter-
mittent feedback from actions taken in a dynamic decision-making environ-
ment? In the present study we hypothesize that reward information (financial, 
social) may provide useful signals that can guide decision-making in these 
situations. To examine this, we present three experiments in which people 
make decisions directly towards controlling a dynamically uncertain output. 
We manipulate the framing of incentives (gains and losses) and the form of 
the incentives (financial, social), and measure their impact on decision-mak- 
ing performance (both in frequent and intermittent output feedback condi-
tions). Overall, performance suffered under intermittent output feedback. 
Relative to social rewards, financial rewards generally improved control per-
formance, and a gains framing (financial, social) leading to better perfor-
mance than a losses framing (financial, social). To understand how rewards 
affect behavior in our tasks, we present a reinforcement learning model to 
capture the learning and performance profiles in each of our experiments. 
This study shows that information regarding incentives impacts the levels of 
exploration, the optimality of decisions-making, and the variability in the 
strategies people develop to control a dynamic output experienced frequently 
and intermittently. 
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1. Introduction 
Many of the control based-decision-making situations that we face in the real 
world are non-stationary. This means that the outputs we are trying to control 
change state from one moment to the next, which requires us to react and adapt 
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our decision-making on a regular basis (Brehmer, 1992; Osman, 2010). Non- 
stationary environments are especially difficult to make decisions because we 
often face uncertainty regarding the source of change to the output, and this un-
certainty is exacerbated when the output feedback itself is only experienced in-
frequently. In real terms this means that we have to make decisions without re-
liably knowing the consequences of our actions at the time the decision is made 
(Osman, 2014; Sterman, 1989).  
In the essence then, the present study includes three experiments, each of 
which are designed to reveal how reward information (social, financial) might be 
a candidate for guiding decision-making when controlling a dynamic output 
that is either experienced infrequently and frequently. To consider the role of 
reward information on decision-making, and how it may facilitate decision- 
making in general, but also under conditions of extreme uncertainty, we discuss 
two literatures: judgment and decision-making work on intermittent vs. fre-
quent feedback, and incentive-based decision-making. In addition, we present 
theoretical and computational models of decision-making under uncertainty as a 
basis on which hypotheses are generated, and which also informs the model 
(SLIDER, Osman, Glass, & Hola, 2015) we utilize in this study. 
1.1. Judgment and Decision-Making Work on Intermittent vs.  
Frequent Feedback 
The main focus of work contrasting frequent with intermittent feedback is 
largely restricted to judgment and decision-making tasks in the accounting and 
management domain tasks (Feiler, Tong, & Larrick, 2013; Frederickson, Peffer, 
& Pratt, 1999; Luckett & Eggleton, 1991; Lurie & Swaminathan, 2009). For in-
stance, Frederickson et al. (1999) found that increasing the frequency of output 
feedback regarding the return on investment decisions, though not informative 
of decision-quality in their task, unnecessarily focused participants’ attention on 
the success of the outputs achieved, and to no good effect on their decision- 
making performance. In line with this, Lurie and Swaminathan (2009) also 
found similar effects. They compared the impact on decision-making by varying 
the frequency of presentation of output feedback (every 6th trial, every 3rd trial, 
every trial) when participants were required to make decisions regarding retail-
ing decisions on the amount of products to be sold prior to each selling period. 
They found that when output feedback (i.e. number of orders made, and the re-
sulting profit/loss) was presented on every trial, participants adjusted their deci-
sions frequently, which in turn led to poorer decision-making performance as 
compared to those experiencing less (intermittent) feedback. The authors spe-
culated that the presence of frequent feedback focused attention acutely on mi-
nor changes in the output value while at the same time truncating memory of 
choice behavior over longer time horizons. This led to an abandonment of rele-
vant knowledge gained over time. In contrast, when feedback was presented in-
termittently, the decision-maker was forced to evaluate and reflect on the expe-
rienced changes in the output, and so their focus was on adapting rather than 
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reacting to output changes. However, as Lurie and Swaminathan (2009) com-
mented, it isn’t clear how performance related incentives may have interacted 
with the frequency with which output feedback was presented. 
Intermittent Output Feedback in the Present Study 
In the present study we aim to address the issue highlighted by Lurie and Swa-
minathan (2009) by examining the extent to which incentivizing control per-
formance (in which we present reward information on every trial) is affected by 
infrequent (every 5th trial) or frequent output feedback (every trial). The reward 
scheme we introduce in our study is less informationally rich than output feed-
back. That is, reward information only indicates generally whether one is further 
or closer to target by a lot or a little, but not precisely how much; whereas output 
feedback provides precise details in this regard. Therefore, a tentative hypothesis 
would be that, relying on reward information to learn about the effectiveness of 
one’s decision-making strategies in an infrequent output feedback condition 
should lead to poorer performance than when the output feedback is presented 
frequently, because reward information is less precise than output feedback. 
However, based on prior studies (Frederickson et al., 1999; Lurie & Swamina-
than, 2009), a more general hypothesis is that, compared to frequent feedback, 
intermittent feedback should lead to better decision-making performance in our 
dynamic decision-making task. 
1.2. The Role of Rewards in Judgment and Decision-Making 
Work in decision sciences (incl., psychology, behavioral economics, economics, 
management) has often shown that the presentation of monetary incentives can 
actually have a detrimental rather than corrective or positive effect on deci-
sion-making performance (for review see Kamenica, 2012). The speculation is 
that financial incentives interfere with personal intrinsic motivations to perform 
a given task (Ariely, Gneezy, Loewenstein, & Mazar, 2009; Bahrick, 1954; Eisen-
berger & Cameron, 1996; Kamenica, 2012; Lepper, & Greene, 2015; McGraw, 
1978; Deci & Ryan, 1985). This is often referred to as the crowding out effect 
(Deci, 1976; Frey, 1997; Lepper & Greene, 2015). Moreover, there is evidence to 
suggest that monetary incentives alone are not sufficient, and need to be pre-
sented in combination with output feedback in order to improve deci-
sion-making performance (Buchheit et al., 2012). To complement this, an asso-
ciation has been made between monetary rewards and expertise such that the 
greater the skill required to perform the decision-making task accurately the less 
likely financial incentives positively impact on performance (Vera-Munoz, 
1998). 
While there is a considerable body of work showing the negative impact of fi-
nancial incentives on judgment and decision-making performance, there has 
been a strong drive in the decision sciences to use financial incentives on the 
premise that, like labor in the real world, participants devote cognitive effort 
when making choices in experimental settings, and so should be recompensed 
financially as they would in the real world (Bonner & Sprinkle, 2002; Hertwig & 
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Ortmann, 2001; Smith & Walker, 1993). There is an implicit assumption that the 
link between rewards and performance is based on a mechanism by which re-
wards increase effort, which in turn improves performance (Bonner & Sprinkle, 
2002; Buchheit et al., 2012). But, what counts as reliable metrics of cognitive ef-
fort is by no means settled (for discussion see Bonner and Sprinkle, 2002). Addi-
tionally, the difficulty with providing a more specific answer is that the judgment 
and decision-making tasks in which financial incentives are used vary in “effort”, 
i.e., time taken to complete, difficulty, skill, and complexity. Therefore, without 
any predefined description of mental effort that can be applied to a deci-
sion-making task, it is hard to generate precise predictions regarding the relative 
improvement of performance based on financial rewards. Moreover, given the 
empirical landscape regarding the role of rewards in decision-making, it is not 
clear as to whether rewards do reliably lead to improvements in performance.  
Reward Schemes in the Present Study 
In order to make some accurate predictions regarding the role of rewards in our 
decision-making task, and to avoid the problem of specifying what effort is ne-
cessary to accurately complete the task, in the present study we use a payoff 
scheme that is directly tied to decision-making performance. Thus, any benefits 
that we observe through the use of a reward scheme (either financial or social, 
presented intermittently or frequently) can be identified as effective because the 
reward information signals useful information about performance to the partic-
ipant, without having to make any assumptions about the connection between 
reward and effort. That is, we introduce a point allocation system that indicates 
the magnitude of the difference between achieved output value and the target 
value (few points indicates “far from target”, many points indicated “close to 
target”); though again this is not as precise as actual output feedback which in-
dicates the exact output value and the difference between the target output value. 
As a result, the points scheme we develop is directly connected to the goal of the 
dynamic decision-making task, which is to achieve an output value that is as 
close to target as possible for the course of the experimental session. There is a 
related literature that has specifically examined the relationship or “regulatory 
fit” between the pay-off structure of a sequential decision-making task and one’s 
personal goals (either promotion-based [seeking to maximize gains], or preven-
tion-based [seeking to minimize losses], Higgins, 1997). If the goal the individu-
al is pursuing is aligned with the reward structure of the task, then decision- 
making performance increases relative to when the goals and reward structure 
are misaligned (Otto, Markman, Gureckis, & Love, 2010; Worthy, Maddox, & 
Markman, 2007). In order to extend this literature to the present study, the ex-
periments we devise involve an incentive scheme that has two framings (finan-
cial gains/positive social rewards, financial losses/negative social rewards), simi-
lar to prevention and promotion focus goals as characterized by Higgins (1997). 
In the present experiments in gains/positive conditions (Experiment 1) partici-
pants are always rewarded for their performance, but the magnitude of the re-
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ward is based on the accuracy of their control performance (closer to target = 10 
points gained, further away from target = 5 points gained). In the financial set 
up, the rewards are presented as money, in the social rewards set up participants 
still have the same payoff structure, but the rewards are framed socially (Expe-
riments 2 and 3). In the losses/negative conditions participants start off with a 
lump sum, but they will always lose money, but the amount they lose is depen-
dent on their control performance (closer to target = 5 points lost, further away 
from target = 10 points lost). We predict that, if the regulatory fit literature ge-
neralizes to dynamic decision-making tasks, then when there is a fit between 
global (i.e., task goal, which in dynamic control is promotion-based) and local 
rewards (i.e., financial gains/positive social rewards), then we would expect more 
exploratory behaviors and better overall decision-making performance, when 
there is a mismatch with the local reward structure (financial losses/negative so-
cial rewards), for which we expect more exploitative behaviors, which we discuss 
in more detail in the next section. 
1.3. Computational Modeling of Dynamic Decision-Making 
The aim here is to ground the proposed computation model within computa-
tional work that has been developed to account for behavior in dynamic con-
trol-based decision-making tasks. From this we introduce the Single Limited 
Input, Dynamic Exploratory Response Model (SLIDER, Osman, Glass, & Hola, 
2015). At the heart of most computational models of dynamic decision- making 
is a reinforcement learning component. For example, Le Pelley (2004) presents a 
hybrid model which uses associative knowledge accrued from prior experience 
to shape learning in a novel training episode. Erev and Roth (1998) demonstrate 
that simple reinforcement learning models can describe human performance in 
dynamic games. In turn, at the heart of all reinforcement learning models is a 
memory mechanism which updates as a function of prediction error-that is, the 
discrepancy between a predicted output and the observed output (Sutton & Bar-
to, 1998). Beyond a mathematical description of behavior, neurophysiological 
evidence attributes a reinforcement learning role to underlying neural mechan-
isms (specifically to regions located in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex; Chase, 
Kumar, Eickhoff, & Dombrovski, 2015). Thus, reinforcement learning is a criti-
cal and useful abstraction of human decision making. 
In addition to reinforcement learning, human behavior in dynamic decision 
making scenarios has been characterized using computational models which in-
stantiate the combination or interaction of two or more cognitive mechanisms 
(Cisek, 2006). For example, Experience-Weighted Attraction (EWA) models 
combine higher level belief-based models with reinforcement learning to gener-
ate a unified strategy selection approach (Camerer & Ho, 1999). EWA models 
adapt to changing features in the learning environment, consistent with empiri-
cal characterizations of strategy selection (Yechiam, Busemeyer, Stout, & Becha-
ra, 2005). The EWA models demonstrated these abilities after the addition of a 
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learning decay mechanism. For this reason, the present paper will utilize a 
learning decay mechanism in the computational modeling procedure. 
The CLARION model, which has been most commonly applied to dynamic 
decision-making tasks, uses a combination of sub-symbolic representation in the 
form of hidden neural network layers with back-propagation reinforcement 
learning (implicit) and symbolic goal representation and attentional control (ex-
plicit) (Brooks, Wilson, & Sun, 2012; Sun, Slusarz, & Terry, 2005). The rein-
forcement learning mechanisms in CLARION are parameterized with learning 
weights which are modified with higher level systems which act as attentional 
control mechanisms within the model. Below, we will specify a computational 
model which similarly combines reinforcement mechanisms using a variable 
gating procedure. In addition, Gibson (2007) utilized a two-stage model com-
bining connectionist learning with explicit hypothesis testing processes as a 
means to characterize transfer effects in dynamic decision making from sub- 
symbolic to symbolic processes. Such hybrid models have been used to model 
the way decision making systems cope with uncertainty, which is often characte-
ristic of dynamic decision-making environments.  
Using unsupervised associative learning via self-organizing maps (SOMs), 
Van Pham, Tran, and Kamei (2014) developed learning models which cope with 
financial uncertainty. The model learned to deal with financial uncertainty 
which arises from stock-market fluctuations. These fluctuations represent a sin-
gle output value (for one particular traded stock) which results from myriad 
complex and dynamic underlying factors. The decision maker must learn to ad-
just their strategy over time in order make effective decisions based on the single 
value as it fluctuates over time. Similarly, the present set of experiments involves 
a task in which there is a single output value which represents the summation of 
various hidden factors in the decision-making environment. The success of a 
hybrid reinforcement learning model in assessing fluctuating market values over 
time is an indication that reinforcement-based decision models with an explora-
tion-exploitation meta-decision component may offer an effective tool for clas-
sifying human behavior in a dynamic decision making task. 
Here, we present a model which utilizes associative learning to produce a 
probabilistic action selection distribution. Originally developed in Osman et al. 
(2015), the model has been used to model behavioral characteristics in dynamic 
decision making tasks as a function of system uncertainty. The Single Limited 
Input, Dynamic Exploratory Responses (SLIDER) model inputs information 
from a single and variable source of external information about the state of the 
environment and generates probabilistic output responses for multiple and si-
multaneous action options. The single output source may be limited in any way, 
such as intermittent, delayed, partial, binary, noisy, or otherwise incomplete 
feedback information. The multiple output action space can include anywhere 
from 1 to N possible response options, where N is a finite real number, each of 
which may include a gradient of discrete response options. The associative 
learning mechanism at the heart of the model is based on classic reinforcement 
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learning with differing learning rates for positive and negative reward channels. 
The associative learning is integrated over the various action options with an at-
tentional action control free parameter. The action selection procedure involves 
an exploration-exploitation free parameter which varies between pure random 
selection (extreme exploration) and maximum expected value peak picking (ex-
treme exploitation). In this way, SLIDER is capable of learning to control the 
state of a single output value by selecting amongst various action response pos-
sibilities. 
In order to characterize dynamic decision making under intermittent and 
noisy feedback, we utilize SLIDER to model empirical behavior in three experi-
ments. We are interested in dynamic decision making when full information 
about the state of the system is only available intermittently, and the reward sig-
nal is presented either as a cumulative gain or loss (Experiment 1), or as nega-
tively or positively valenced social reward (Experiment 2, 3). Furthermore, we 
measure baseline behavior under full state information (Experiments 1, 2 and 3). 
The critical behavioral windows lie between intermittent full information, when 
only partial information is available. Behavior during these limited information 
windows can be distinguished between reward conditions in terms of response 
variability, and thus the exploration parameter in SLIDER becomes a free para-
meter of interest. 
1.3.1. Single Limited Input, Dynamic Exploratory Response Model  
(SLIDER) 
SLIDER is based on memory trace reinforcement learning. After each trial, a 
reinforcement history for each of the three inputs is updated according to 
whether the input choices resulted in the discrepancy between achieved output 
value and goal value increasing or decreasing. On the following trial, the rein-
forcement history becomes the basis for a probabilistic action selection function 
using Luce’s (1959) choice. Previous research has found that participants often 
vary the value of more than one input on each trial. Thus, the model includes an 
inter-input gating mechanism which allows each input value selection to take 
into account the action selection probabilities of the other two inputs. 
The resulting model features four free parameters: an exploitation parameter 
governing the action selection function, an inter-input gating parameter, and 
two memory-updating reinforcement strengths (one for successful trials, and 
one for unsuccessful trials). To evaluate the model, the model’s probability of 
selecting the human participant’s input choice are combined across all trials and 
all three inputs into a single model fit value. The model is fit to an individual 
participant’s responses by an optimization procedure that determines the para-
meter values which maximize the fit value. 
1.3.2. Memory-Updating Reinforcement Strengths 
After each trial, the computational model determines whether the input values it 
selected resulted in the output value moving towards or away from the goal. For 
each input, a Gaussian curve with a mean equal to the chosen input is con-
M. Osman et al. 
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structed (Equation (1)). 
( )
1
2 2
update
1 e
2π
pv v
P v σ
σ
− 
−   
 =                      (1) 
where Pupdate(v) is the probability of selecting a value of v when the previous se-
lected value was vp. 
This curve is then summed (successful trial) or subtracted (unsuccessful trial) 
to the input’s former reinforcement history. A free parameter (one for successful 
trials, one for unsuccessful trials) determines the relative weight of the updating 
summation. For example, if the memory-updating positive reinforcement 
strength is 0.8, then the reinforcement history is updated such that 80% of the 
new reinforcement history reflects the current input value choice and 20% re-
flects the previous reinforcement history (Equation (2)). 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )History update1 s sP v P v sign R P vγ γ  = − + ⋅ ⋅             (2) 
where PHistory(v) is the input selection probability history for input value v, γs is 
the memory-updating reinforcement strength for feedback s (positive or nega-
tive), and R is the change in the output value’s distance to the goal from the pre-
vious trial. 
In summary, there are two memory-updating reinforcement strengths, one for 
positive outputs and one for negative outputs. Each strength represents the 
weight with which current choices impact choice history. 
1.3.3. Inter-Input Parameter 
Before the final probabilistic selection of the input value occurs, for each of the 
three inputs, the reinforcement history of the two other inputs is taken into con-
sideration. The level of this consideration is controlled by an inter-input para-
meter. This parameter determines the strength at which the reinforcement his-
tory of other two inputs will influence the action selection of the input at hand. 
This is done using a gating equation which weights the alternate inputs using the 
inter-input parameter (Equation (3)). 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )Intercue History History History1 2 2A A B Cc c c cP v P v P v P v
β ββ     = − ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅        
 (3) 
where PIntercue(vcA) is the probability of selecting value v for input cA (e.g., input 
1), 
β is the inter-input parameter, and cA and cB are the other two inputs (e.g., 
input 2 and 3). At high values of the inter-input parameter, the computational 
model is more likely to pick similar input values for all three inputs. As the in-
ter-input parameter approaches 0, the model is less likely to select an action for 
one input based on the reinforcement history of the other two. 
1.3.4. Exploitation Parameter 
On each trial, the computational model evaluates the reinforcement history of 
each input to generate the probability of selecting each of the 100 input value 
options. From these options, a single value is chosen using the Softmax decision 
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rule (Equation (4)). The equation’s exploitation parameter, K, determines the 
level of determinism in the choice process (Daw & Doya, 2006). As K approach-
es ∞, the process is more likely to choose the most probable option. At lower 
values, the equation is more likely to pick a less probable option. 
( )
( )
( )
Interinput
Interinput
Final 100
0
e
e
i
i
P v K
i P v K
j
P v
 ⋅ 
 ⋅ 
=
=
∑
                   (4) 
where PFinal(vi) is the final probability of selecting input value vi, K is the exploi-
tation parameter, and vj are all the input values from 0 to 100 for given input. 
1.3.5. Predictions Generated from the Model   
The SLIDER computational model can be used to demonstrate predicted per-
formance over a range of Exploitation Parameter values. This is accomplished by 
setting the model to learn the task, as opposed to fitting human response data. 
The task is run thousands of times at various levels of Exploitation Parameter. 
Additionally, two versions of the task were tested: a full feedback scenario (full 
reward feedback on every trial), versus an intermittent feedback scenario (full 
reward feedback only every fifth trial, otherwise limited binary feedback).  
Figure 1 illustrates that while higher levels of exploitation are generally im-
portant for effective learning, intermittent feedback is predicted to be detrimen-
tal. Although, the model predicts that this may be overcome by adopting a more 
exploitative strategy. Based on our model, with regards to performance, in rela-
tion to sensitivity to only positive reward feedback (successful trials) versus neg-
ative reward feedback (unsuccessful trials), participants should be more sensitive 
to positive feedback at learning and somewhat more sensitive to negative feed-
back at test. Therefore, based on reward feedback, we would expect differential  
 
 
Figure 1. SLIDER performance varied over different levels of exploitation pa-
rameter. 
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effects on performance in the test phase of our experiments, as compared to the 
learning phase.  
2. Experiment 1 
2.1. Method 
2.1.1. Participants 
71 participants were recruited from the Queen Mary, University of London 
community and on average received £5.46 (approx. $9). Fifty-five of the partic-
ipants were female, and ages ranged from 18 to 36 (M = 20.02, SD = 3.52). Par-
ticipants were randomly assigned to the Gains intermittent condition (n = 26), 
Losses intermittent condition (n = 25). For the frequent feedback conditions, 
participants were randomly allocated to Gains frequent condition (n = 10) or 
the Losses frequent condition (n = 10). The number of participants allocated to 
the frequent condition was less than that of the intermittent feedback condi-
tions, for the following reasons. Considerable prior work (Osman et al., 2015; 
Osman & Speekenbrink, 2011, 2012) using the same task design has shown that 
the pattern of responses to frequent feedback in exact same stable dynamic de-
cision-making tasks used presently is consistent, particular when participants 
are exposed to the same length of training trials (i.e. 100 training trials), as is 
the case with the present set of experiments. Therefore, there was already an 
established baseline of reliable performance in frequent feedback conditions, 
which were directly comparable to the conditions designed in our experiments, 
so for this reason we allocated more participants to the novel conditions de-
signed in this Experiment. Moreover, we applied the same rationale to Experi-
ment 2 and 3.  
2.1.2. Procedure 
In the present dynamic control task, the participant attempted to control a single 
output value towards a target goal (see Figure 2). To do so, on each trial the par-
ticipant chooses values for three separate inputs. These input values are then 
combined via the dynamic control equation (Equation (1)) then summed with 
the output value plus some normally distributed random noise (standard devia-
tion = 8). In this way, the participant’s input selections guide the output value. 
The output value is initialized at 178 with a goal value of 62 and a “safe range” 
(±10 around the goal value): 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 21 65 65y t y t x t x t e t= − + − +               (5) 
where y(t) is the output on trial t, x1 is the positive input, x2 is the negative input, 
and e is an error term randomly sampled from a normal distribution with a 
mean of 0 and SD of 8. 
The dynamic control equation was designed such that one input has a positive 
impact on the output value, one input has a negative impact, and a third input 
has no impact. The impact of the input is not labeled or available to the partici-
pant, thus the participant must learn to control the output value based solely on  
M. Osman et al. 
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(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure 2. (a) Presents screen shots of what would be seen by a participant for every aspect 
of a single trial, in which they would have the opportunity to manipulate inputs (via the 
selection of none, one, two, or all three inputs to change the values of) and then, depend-
ing on the experimental condition they were assigned to, they would see the output feed-
back as well as the reward information. (b) Shows a more detailed version of the screen 
shot of information at the end of a trial in which the participant has completed several 
trials of the task. Here the cumulative output feedback is presented along with the inputs 
that were manipulated and the reward received. 
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the resulting movement of the output value on each trial. After each trial, the 
input values are reset to 0. The participant can then freely select input values for 
each of the three inputs before confirming the choices. A critical feature of this 
control task is that the output value can go below the target, meaning the partic-
ipant must dynamically adapt in order to maximize performance. After an initial 
learning phase of 100 trials (Block 1), the participants completed two Test blocks 
of 20 trials each. In the first Test block (Block 2), the starting value and goal cri-
terion were equivalent to the learning phase. In the second Test block (Block 3), 
there was a different starting value and goal value than the earlier phases. At the 
beginning of each block, the control task was reset to the initial state. Partici-
pants were able to view a plot of the output value as it changed from trial to trial. 
In Experiment 1 for infrequent conditions, this plot was available only on every 
5 trials. In Block 1, it was available on each of the first 5 trials, thereafter it was 
only presented every 5th trial. For the frequent conditions, this plot was available 
only every trial for both Block 1 and Block 2 and Block 3; this was the only criti-
cal difference between the manipulation of the frequency of feedback between 
gains/losses frequent conditions and gains/losses infrequent conditions.  
Task performance was incentivized using a point paradigm which was ex-
plained to them in advance of taking part in the experiment. Participants at-
tempted to either incrementally earn points towards a points criterion (Gains 
conditions), or prevent losing points to remain above a points criterion (Losses 
condition). A response which moved the output value towards the goal criterion 
(relative to the previous trial) was considered a “correct” response, while a re-
sponse which moved the output value away from the goal criterion was consi-
dered an “incorrect” response. In the Gains condition, participants started with 0 
points and achieved +10 points for a correct response, and +5 points for an in-
correct response. In the Losses condition, participants started with 1500 (in 
Block 1, 300 in Blocks 2 and 3) and achieved −5 points for a correct response, 
and −10 points for an incorrect response. The points criterion was 1500 (Block 
1) and 300 (Blocks 2 and 3) for the Gains condition and 0 for the Losses condi-
tion.       
The selection of the values 1500 for Block 1, and 300 for Block 2 and 3, was 
based on pilot work in which we determined point allocations that would make 
the Gains and Losses conditions approximately equivalent in terms of available 
points. Thus, participants were given Gains or Losses information on each trial, 
despite only being able to view the output value plot (i.e., the Full Feedback In-
formation) on every 5th trial (see Table 1).  
For both the Gains and Losses condition, a points bar (i.e., single bar graph), 
was shown along with the current level of the achieved (or retained) number of 
points. On each trial, the number of points further added (Gains) or subtracted 
(Losses) from the total was displayed prominently alongside the points bar in-
side of a graphic of a money bag (see Figure 2). Monetary payment was contin-
gent on performance in the Test blocks, although the point’s structure and pro-
cedure was used on all blocks. 
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Table 1. Overview of the experimental design. 
Experiment Reward schemes Type of Reward Freq. of Full Feedback 
1 Gains vs. Losses Financial Every Trial vs. Every 5 Trials 
2 Positive vs. Negative Social Every Trial vs. Every 5 Trials 
3 Positive vs. Negative Social Every Trial vs. Every 5 Trials 
 (replication)  
2.2. Results 
2.2.1. Deviation from Optimal Response 
Post-hoc power analyses for all below experiments resulted in Power ranging 
from 0.80 to 0.98 (with α = 0.05, and non-centrality parameter λ ranging from 
15.0 to 26.6), demonstrated very good statistical power with which to interpret 
the results. In order to measure task performance, the deviation from the optim-
al response was calculated for each trial. The optimal response was calculated by 
considering the hypothetical settings for the three input inputs which would 
have moved the output value as close as possible to the goal criterion. The devia-
tion from this response was calculated using the actual participant responses for 
the three input inputs. For example, if the participant selected values of {50, 60, 
40} on the {positive, negative, neutral} input inputs, the previous output value 
was 90, and the randomly sampled error term was +2, then the new output value 
would be 90 + 50 − 60 + 2 = 82. The presented magnitude of change would be 8 
and the presented direction of change would be toward the goal of 62 (positive 
reward). In this case, the set of optimal input selections would have varied li-
nearly from {0, 18, any} to {82, 100, any}. Thus, the solution with the shortest 
Euclidean distance to the participant’s choices would have been {46, 64, any}, 
with a distance of 5.66. This value represents the deviation from optimal re-
sponse, and was computed for each trial.  
A 2 Feedback Frequency (Every trial, Every 5 trials) × 2 reward schedule 
(Gains, Losses) × 3 Block (Block 1, Block 2, Block 3) repeated measures ANOVA 
was conducted on the deviation from optimal response. There was a significant 
main effect of reward schedule (F1,67 = 5.59, p = 0.02, η2 = 0.08) across both fre-
quent and intermittent feedback conditions, such that in general those in the 
Gains conditions provided more optimal responses relative to Losses conditions. 
Moreover, there was a strong main effect of Feedback Frequency (F1,67 = 51.7, p 
< 0.001, η2 = 0.44) such that participants who received frequent feedback dem-
onstrated more optimal responses than those in the Intermittent feedback con-
ditions (see Figure 3). All other contrasts were non-significant (Fs < 2). 
2.2.2. Response Variability during Partial Feedback 
Response variability was computed as the standard deviation of the response 
values over the course of block, summed over the three inputs. Thus, a random 
responder would have a response variability of 87.9. To compare response varia-
bility during intermittent (every fifth trial) verses frequent feedback (every trial), 
we conducted a 2 Feedback Frequency (Every trial, Every 5 trials) × 2 reward  
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Figure 3. Mean output scores (Standard Error ± 1) based on calculation of deviations from optimal by Experiment 
(Experiment 1, Experiment 2), by reward scheme and type (Experiment 1: Gains vs. Losses; Experiment 2: Negative 
vs. Positive social feedback). 
 
schedule (Gains, Losses) × 3 Block repeated measures ANOVA on response va-
riability. There were no significant main effects or contrasts (all Fs < 1.3; see 
Figure 4). 
2.2.3. Computational Modeling 
The SLIDER model was used to calculate the best fitting exploitation parameter 
for each block. In the model, as the Exploitation parameter reaches ∞, the more 
likely the model is to peak pick the response with the highest estimated expected 
value. At an Exploitation parameter of 0, the model is equally likely to pick any 
of the response options (i.e., the response probability distribution is uniform). A 
2 Feedback Frequency (Every trial, Every 5 trials) × 2 reward schedule (Gains, 
Losses) × 3 Block repeated measures ANOVA was conducted on the best fit Ex-
ploitation parameter. There were no significant main Effects or contrasts (all Fs < 
1.8; see Figure 3) (see Figure 5).  
2.3. Discussion 
Contrary to suggestions that full feedback may lead suboptimal performance due 
to over-correction (Frederickson et al., 1999; Lurie & Swaminathan, 2009), the 
current results demonstrate that those with full information performed better 
compared to those with partial information. This was most likely due to the fact  
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Figure 4. Mean response variability scores (Standard Error ± 1) during trial periods when output value informa-
tion was unavailable to the participant, by Experiment (Experiment 1, Experiment 2), by reward scheme and type 
(Experiment 1: Gains vs. Losses; Experiment 2: Negative vs. Positive social feedback). 
 
 
Figure 5. Mean (Standard Error ± 1) best fitting exploitation parameters using the SLIDER model, with mean ex-
ploitation fits scores based on calculation of deviations from optimal by Experiment (Experiment 1, Experiment 2), 
by reward scheme and type (Experiment 1: Gains vs. Losses; Experiment 2: Negative vs. Positive social feedback). 
 
that participants were able to use the available full information to make appro-
priate trial-by-trial decisions without leading to over-correction. 
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Providing full information did not lead to differences in exploitative behavior 
nor response variability, although there was an overall main effect of gains ver-
sus losses framing. Those in the gains condition, regardless of the level of tri-
al-by-trial information provided, responded more optimally. This result is in line 
with the regulatory focus literature which predicts a regulatory match when local 
incentives match with global incentives. Whether a regulatory match is benefi-
cial depends on task demands (Grimm, Markman, Maddox, & Baldwin, 2008). 
In the present dynamic decision making task, the match of the local and global 
rewards framework leads to performance enhancements. When feedback is in- 
termittent, the mismatch condition responds more conservatively (lower re-
sponse variability, more exploitative choices), leading to poorer performance. 
This suggests that dynamic decision making tasks are more compatible with ex-
ploratory and flexible choice strategies, and that this is exacerbated when feed-
back information is limited. 
3. Experiment 2 
3.1. Method 
In Experiments 1, participants were incentivized with a point goal criterion 
which incremented on each trial (increasing in Gains, decreasing in Losses) de-
pending on performance. In order to test the differential impact of positively 
versus negatively valenced reward signals, we developed a method which dis-
played either feedback in terms of a social reward signal; participants still re-
ceived financial rewards relative to performance, but the presentation of the re-
wards was presented socially rather than financially. In both conditions, after 
each trial, participants were shown an image of their purported supervisor’s re-
sponse to their response selection. In the Positive condition, the image was ei-
ther happy (“correct” trial i.e., closer to target) or neutral (“incorrect” trial i.e., 
further away from target). In the Negative condition, the image was either neu-
tral (correct trial) or negative (incorrect trial; see Figure 6).  
 
 
Figure 6. Social feedback images used in Experiments 2 and 3. In the Positive condition, 
correct response (left) and incorrect response (middle). In Negative condition, correct 
response (middle) and incorrect response (right). 
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Thus, the payoff structure remained the same as in Experiment 1, although 
the reward presentation was in the form of social feedback. This social feedback 
indicated trial-by-trial performance and translated into the performance-related 
bonus payment using the same payment schedule as in the Gains/Losses condi-
tions in Experiment 1. 
3.1.1. Participants 
64 participants were recruited from the Queen Mary, University of London 
community and paid £6 ($9). 45 of the participants were female, and ages ranged 
from 18 to 49 (M = 27.4, SD = 5.12). Participants were randomly assigned to the 
Positive infrequent feedback condition (n = 31) or the Negative infrequent con-
dition (n = 31). Both conditions were exposed to the same intermittent output 
feedback set up. Participants in the frequent feedback conditions were randomly 
assigned to the Positive frequent feedback condition (n = 11) or the Negative 
frequent feedback condition (n = 11). All participants were recruited from the 
Queen Mary, University of London community and on average received £5.52 
(approx. $9). 
3.1.2. Procedure 
Experiment 2 differed from Experiment 1 only in that reward feedback informa-
tion was given in the form of either positively or negatively valenced social re-
ward information, but output feedback was presented intermittently either every 
fifth trial in each of the three blocks for the infrequent feedback conditions, or 
on every trial in the frequent feedback conditions. 
3.2. Results 
3.2.1. Deviation from Optimal Response 
To examine performance, we conducted a 2 Feedback Frequency (Every trial, 
Every 5 trials) × 2 social reward schedule (Positive, Negative) × 3 Block (Block 1, 
Block 2, Block 3) repeated measures ANOVA on the deviation from optimal re-
sponse. There was a significant main effect of Block (F2,120 = 7.66, p ≤ 0.001, η2 = 
0.11) consistent with increasing performance from Block 1 to Block 3 (see Fig-
ure 3). Moreover, there was a strong main effect of Feedback Frequency (F1,60 = 
52.5, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.47) such that participants who received frequent feedback 
demonstrated more optimal responses (see Figure 3). All other interactions 
were non-significant (Fs < 1). 
3.2.2. Response Variability during Partial Feedback 
To compare response variability during infrequent feedback (every fifth trial) to 
frequent feedback (every trial), we conducted a 2 Feedback Frequency (Every 
trial, Every 5 trials) × 2 social reward schedule (Positive, Negative) × 3 Block re-
peated measures ANOVA on the variability of response variability. There were 
no significant main Effects or interactions (all Fs < 1.5; see Figure 4). 
3.2.3. Computational Modeling 
A 2 Feedback Frequency (Every trial, Every 5 trials) × 2 social reward schedule 
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(Positive, Negative) × 3 Block repeated measures ANOVA was conducted on the 
best fit Exploitation parameter. There were no significant main effects or inte-
ractions (all Fs < 3.4; see Figure 5). 
3.3. Discussion 
In Experiment 1, the Gains condition demonstrated more optimal performance 
relative to the Losses condition over both full and infrequent feedback condi-
tions. In Experiment 2, we did not detect a performance difference between pos-
itive and negative social reward conditions. Consistent with Experiment 1, those 
in the frequent feedback conditions demonstrated enhanced performance rela-
tive to those with infrequent feedback. As expected, this contrast demonstrates 
that people are able to use the trial-by-trial information to inform their decisions 
on this dynamic decision making task. Interestingly, performance in Experiment 
2 increased over blocks, whereas this performance increase was not detected in 
Experiment 1. Post-hoc analysis suggests that this difference was due to stable 
yet more optimal performance by the Gains condition in Experiment 1, as well 
as shifts in strategy over time by the Losses condition in Experiment 1 as meas-
ured by response variability and best fit exploitation parameter. The perfor-
mance increase over time detected in Experiment 2 could be the result of de-
creased sensitivity to the social reward feedback manipulation, which lead to 
fewer shifts in strategy and the emergence of a general learning curve. The lack 
of a local and global rewards framing effect when local rewards were operationa-
lized as social reward indicates that either our social reward stimuli were ineffec-
tive in eliciting the necessary response, or the results support previous findings 
that social and monetary rewards are processed by different underlying neural 
structures. Rademacher et al. (2010) provides evidence that while anticipation 
for both monetary and social rewards activate brain areas important for learn-
ing, social stimuli was more strongly associated with amygdala activation, while 
monetary stimuli were more associated with thalamic activation. While mone-
tary activation was also part of the global rewards framing in Experiment 2, 
along with social reward, it is possible that overall increased activation in Expe-
riment 2 minimized differences between the positive and negative social re-
wards. To establish the reliability of the findings in Experiment 2, we replicated 
them in Experiment 3. 
4. Experiment 3 
4.1. Method 
4.1.1. Participants 
40 participants were recruited from the Queen Mary, University of London 
community and paid a mean payment of £5.43 (approx. $9). 25 of the partici-
pants were female, and ages ranged from 22 to 53 (M = 29.0, SD = 7.25). Partic-
ipants were randomly assigned to either the Positive or Negative social reward 
schedules, and either experienced feedback on every trial or Every 5 trials condi-
tion (n = 10 in each of the four conditions). 
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4.1.2. Procedure 
Experiment 3 was a replication of Experiment 2, and did not differ from them. 
In one condition, value information was presented on each trial, and in another 
condition it was presented on every 5 trials. The Positive and Negative social re-
ward schedules were implemented identically to Experiment 2. 
4.2. Results 
4.2.1. Deviation from Optimal Response 
As Experiment 3 was conducted as a replication of Experiment 2, we conducted 
a 2 Feedback Frequency (Every trial, Every 5 trials) × 2 social reward schedule 
(Positive, Negative) × 3 Block repeated measures ANOVA on the deviation from 
optimal response. There was a strong main effect of Feedback Frequency (F1,36 = 
49.17, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.58) such that participants who received full information 
feedback on each trial demonstrated more optimal responses. All other interac-
tions were non-significant (Fs < 3.2). 
4.2.2. Response Variability during Partial Feedback 
To compare response variability during infrequent (every fifth trial) to frequent 
(every trial), we conducted a 2 Feedback Frequency (Every trial, Every 5 trials) × 
2 social reward schedule (Positive, Negative) × 3 Block repeated measures 
ANOVA on the variability of response variability. There were no significant 
main Effects or interactions (all Fs < 2.5). 
4.2.3. Computational Modeling 
A 2 Feedback Frequency (Every trial, Every 5 trials) × 2 social reward schedule 
(Positive, Negative) × 3 Block repeated measures ANOVA was conducted on the 
best fit Exploitation parameter. There were no significant main effects or inte-
ractions (all Fs < 3.1). 
4.3. Discussion 
Experiment 3 was a replication of Experiment 2 in that frequency of feedback 
(Every trial vs. Every 5 trials) and social reward valence (Positive vs. Negative) 
were manipulated as between subjects factors, repeated over 3 Blocks of trials. In 
Experiment 3, there was a main effect of Feedback Frequency, in that those who 
received full information regarding the output value on each trial responded 
more optimally than those who received full information on every 5th trial. 
Taken together, the results from Experiments 2 & 3 signify that full feedback 
frequency is important for optimal decision making in dynamic decision making 
environments with multiple inputs with a hidden but discoverable relationship 
to the output variable. However, we did not detect a difference in performance 
between those who received information via a positively valenced social reward 
channel versus a negatively valenced social reward channel. 
5. General Discussion 
Our objective was to examine two critical factors: how rewards affect dynamic 
decision-making in contexts in which the presentation of key information (out-
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put feedback) is presented infrequently or frequently. Overall our key experi-
mental manipulations impacted behavior when reward signals were presented as 
money, and the impact of intermittent feedback on performance was limited to 
reducing optimality performance. The remainder of the discussion will consider 
the implications of our findings with respect to frequency of presentation of 
output feedback, the impact of rewards on dynamic decision-making, and com-
putational models of dynamic decision-making. 
5.1. Frequent vs. Intermittent Feedback 
Overall, our findings contrast work looking at the effects of intermittent feed-
back on forecasting (Frederickson et al., 1999; Lurie & Swaminathan, 2009) 
which suggests frequent output feedback results in poorer judgment accuracy. 
One key difference between this work and the present study is that we set up the 
experiments in such a way that participants were encouraged to go beyond a 
fully exploitative strategy because during the trials in which no output feedback 
was presented, there was always trial-by-trial partial feedback via reward infor-
mation that provided directional information (the sign but not the precise mag-
nitude of the change to the output). This is why we also speculated that output 
feedback presented on every trial would lead to better performance than infre-
quent output feedback, because in the latter case, the most rich information on 
which to learn was presented 20% of the time as compared to 100% of the time 
in the frequent feedback set-ups. However, in general participants seemed to 
keep to the same strategy regardless of whether they were waiting for the next 
update of output information every fifth trial, or on every trial. This suggests 
that the nature of the task itself is one that might induce a consistent application 
of a strategy once one has been found. In line with this, previous work (Osman 
& Speekenbrink, 2011) reported that regardless of how stable or extremely unst-
able the dynamic environment was, strategic behavior tended to be consistent, to 
the extent that participants perseverated even when the visual display on screen 
clearly indicated how poor their chosen strategy was doing. Furthermore, many 
studies have shown that participants in dynamic decision-making tasks tend to 
be rather conservative with respect to adjusting their strategies once they have 
settled on them (Burns & Vollmeyer, 2002; Osman, 2008a, 2008b, 2012; Voll-
meyer et al, 1996). This suggests that, as a result of a high state of uncertainty 
experienced in such tasks (Lipshitz & Strauss, 1997; Sterman, 1989), people are 
reluctant to give up current strategies once they have been established. This leads 
to an over-commitment to a strategy regardless of the frequency of the feedback. 
5.2. Financial vs. Social Rewards 
Our experiments were designed in such a way as to encourage participants to 
rely on the reward information as a signal to their performance, particularly 
when the output feedback was presented intermittently. In the case of financial 
rewards, the map between monetary gains and losses throughout the experiment 
and what would be received at the end of the experiments was the same, where 
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as in the social rewards framing, they had to translate the reactions of the man-
ager into gains or losses and then convert this into monetary gains and losses to 
figure out how much they would get at the end of the experiment. Therefore, 
one simple explanation is that it isn’t the fact that rewards presented as financial 
gains and losses per se that led to the difference between social and financial 
signals, but simply the fact that the financial signals were easier to interpret as 
reward signals because no conversion was needed. 
A second possible explanation is that social reward signals are more ambi-
guous or more complex, and carry different meanings for different individuals, 
and this in turn leads to the signals being perceived in different ways, which in-
creases the variability in decision-making behavior. There is a growing trend in 
the finance literature to examine the effects of financial rewards on social beha-
vior (Aktas, De Bodt, & Cousin, 2011; Camerer & Ho, 1999; Margolis, Elfenbein, 
& Walsh, 2007; Oikonomou, Brooks, & Pavelin, 2014). Overall, the findings 
from these studies suggest that the impact of social rewards vs. financial rewards 
on behavior depends largely on the context in which the behavior is examined. 
In particular, social rewards improve status or reputation are effective in moti-
vating and improving performance but only in contexts in which these factors 
are relevant and appreciated by a norm. For future work, it may be the case that 
activating social norms in the form of social rewards represented by a group 
would lead to better dynamic decision-making performance than simply pre-
senting social rewards connected to a single participant (Andersson, He-
desström, & Gärling, 2014). 
In general, the most consistent findings regarding reward information was 
that a reward schedule that only involved rewards tied to performance was more 
effective in improving performance relative to a loss only reward schedule. We 
speculate that one likely reason for the differences between the two framings is 
the differential impact they have on the decision-makers’ confidence. Consistent 
with this speculation, work looking at the association between rewards and be-
havior has often reported that people see rewards as potential reinforces of 
self-esteem, which can in turn boost performance (Bushman, Moeller, & Crock-
er, 2011). Also, there is work suggesting that rewards may induce confidence or 
even over confidence which can negatively impact performance (González-Val- 
lejo, & Bonham, 2007; Rudski, Lischner, & Albert, 2012). In addition, there is 
work showing that rather than positive reinforcement motivating behavior and 
improving performance, negative reinforcers are a more effective way of im-
proving performance. This is either because losses are more psychologically sa-
lient than gains (Erev & Barron, 2005; Hossain & List, 2012), or because a nega-
tive reinforcer is more informationally useful than a positive reinforcer because 
it focuses attention more acutely on the task at hand (Yechiam & Hochman, 
2014). One reason for this is that there may be mismatches between the task and 
the motivation of the individual, which originates from Higgins (1997) regula-
tory fit framework. 
The basic idea of the work as applied to the present study is that in uncertain 
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environments people must trade off the amount of time they want to spend fo-
cusing on exploiting, against exploring, in the hope that they will be in a better 
more rewarding position in the future. When there is a match between one’s 
motivational state (for which we use instructed goals as a proxy to establish this 
in the present study) and the reward structure of the task (i.e., regulatory fit), 
then this determines the extent of exploitation over exploration (Worthy et al., 
2007). Broadly our findings were supportive of the regulatory fit position. Those 
in the gains conditions showed more exploration because there was a fit between 
the global and local reward structures, regardless of the fact that this was a 
sub-optimal learning strategy (a finding similar to that reported by Worthy et al. 
(2007, Exp 2). Curiously though, in our study, those in the gains condition also 
out performed those in the losses condition, despite using a sub-optimal learn-
ing strategy, even though it was matched to the global strategy. One reason for 
this is that there are multiple layers of strategies that constitute a fit and a mis-
match in our present dynamic decision-making task, and it may be the case that 
matches on some levels are more important for enabling good control perfor-
mance over others. For instance, a decision-maker in a dynamic decision-mak- 
ing task may view their strategy of attempting to reach the target criterion on 
each trial as a promotion focused strategy. Another decision-maker may view 
their attempt to maintain the target criterion for the remaining length of the 
training/test trials after having reached it as a prevention focused strategy. While 
the regulatory fit theory predicted the type of learning strategy that was imple-
mented, this in turn does no necessary predict the success of control perfor-
mance in our decision-making task. 
5.3. Computation Models 
The presented computational model, SLIDER, was designed to capture differ-
ences in choice strategy along the exploratory-exploitative decision making di-
mension Osman et al., (2015). Under financial rewards (Experiment 1), the gains 
condition performed optimally under full and intermittent feedback. The SLIDER 
model demonstrated those in the losses condition were best fit by more exploita-
tive model parameters relative to the gains condition, under intermittent feed-
back. This suggests that the measured performance differences between gains 
and losses under full information feedback might be moderated by an alternate 
decision strategy. The sensitivity of the model fitting procedure to behavioral 
differences under intermittent feedback suggest that associative learning me-
chanisms underlie strategy differences when complete information is unavaila-
ble. Specifically, during a mismatch of the local and global reward framework 
(i.e., a regulatory mismatch), people rely on a more exploitative choice regimen 
in order to maintain system stability. Importantly, this reliance emerges over 
time, and acts as a compensatory mechanism to achieve performance on par 
with those who are in a regulatory match. Additionally, the SLIDER model was 
used to form a specific prediction that performance under full feedback would 
be more optimal than under intermittent feedback. This pattern was demon-
strated in all experiments. Moreover, SLIDER predicted a compensation strategy 
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in the use of increased exploitative choice patterns. In Experiment 1, under fi-
nancial rewards, those under intermittent feedback and a losses reward structure 
do show evidence of utilizing a strategy of increased exploitation in order to 
achieve matched performance. The computational modeling approach outlined 
here demonstrates that it is possible to capture and describe compensatory me-
chanisms under regulatory mismatch in terms of differences in associative 
learning along the exploration-exploitation dimension. 
5.4. Implications and Applications beyond the Dynamic  
Decision-Making Literature 
Characterizing unstable dynamic environments, measuring the impact of dif-
ferent policies and regulations on behavior within them, and understanding 
what the factors are that cause instability in order to minimize it, seem to be 
central issues for many researchers in the management, accounting, banking and 
finance disciplines (Aktas et al., 2011; Bandiera et al., 2011; Margolis et al., 2007; 
Melancon et al., 2011; Melnyk, Bititci, Platts, Tobias, & Andersen, 2014; Oiko-
nomou et al., 2014). These issues lend themselves to paradigms such as dynamic 
control tasks which essentially are toy complex worlds that enable researchers to 
explore multiple factors in the lab (Meder, Le Lec, & Osman, 2013). We show, 
according to our conceptualization of optimality, the extent to which people be-
have optimally, and the factors that enhance (positive reinforcement, frequently 
presented output feedback) optimal dynamic decision-making. Critically, we al-
so show that it is possible to incorporate incentive schemes in such a way as to 
connect them to performance, so that they are meaningful. Our findings reveal 
that financially framed rewards are more potent than socially framed rewards, 
and that only in the former do they induce differences in decision-making and 
learning behaviors (response variability, exploration). These insights can poten-
tially offer same basic understanding of human behavior in dynamic environ-
ments in order to pave the way to answering big practical questions such as: 
What are the appropriate frameworks for assessing the effects of reforms aimed 
at mitigating financial stability? What is the most effective way of ensuring that 
regulation addresses dynamically evolving risks to financial stability (Bank of 
England, 2015)? 
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